

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 09BAKU818,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09BAKU818**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09BAKU818</a>	<a href="#">2009-10-15 07:08</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Baku</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3999424.ece>

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VZCZCXRO0373
RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKB #0818/01 2880708
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 150708Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1890
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0073
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0167
RHMFISS/CDR USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000818

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019 TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [SNAR](#) [ECON](#) [AJ](#) [IR](#)

REF: A. BAKU 806 B. BAKU 139 C. BAKU 132 D. 2008 BAKU 1018 E. BAKU 175 F. BAKU 439 G. BAKU 282

Classified By: [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN ], FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary -----

[1](#)1. (S) Azerbaijan's arms-length, frozen-smile political relationship with Iran has combines firmness on issues of sovereignty, avoidance of pu

[1](#)2. (S) The GOAJ is basically fatalistic about broader international issues involving Iran, and looks to the West and Russia to deal with them.

GOAJ-Iran October Shocks -----

[1](#)3. (C) Bilateral GOAJ-Iran tensions, never far from the surface, flared anew in early October 2009, after a series of unusually harsh attacks

Background -----

[1](#)4. (SBU) Iran made a major economic and political influence-building effort in Azerbaijan in the early 1990's. These included subsidizing a pr (at least until very recently) Turkey, with whom it frequently exchanges high-level official visits.

[1](#)5. (C) Following the return to power of Haidar Aliyev in the early 1990's, the GOAJ and pro-government media dropped all previous Pan-Azeri ar

[1](#)6. (C) Despite some recent Iranian media claims, the GOAJ displays little interest in Iranian Azerbaijani cultural aspirations and issues (alt

Iran's Influence-Building Efforts... -----

[1](#)7. (S) Iranian influence-building activities inside Azerbaijan rest on a tripod of "social engagement" organizations, including an "Iran Assis

[1](#)8. (S) Iranian government and semi-official foundations (some of which operate businesses in Azerbaijan) provide material support to some Fars

...And Propaganda Broadcasts -----

[1](#)9. (C) In addition to these efforts, a nominally private, pro-regime Iranian television station tied to the Revolutionary Guard continues to n inducements to attract/corrupt key GOAJ officials and other influential Azerbaijanis, and this may be a compounding factor (ref d).

Baku Visit of President Peres -----

[1](#)10. (SBU) The GOAJ and Azerbaijani political figures and organizations from across the spectrum expressed deep resentment over heavy-handed Ir

[1](#)11. (S) In the end, the visit went forward smoothly, and some modest cooperation agreements were signed. The strong Iranian reaction may have

Harsh Iranian Press Attacks -----

[1](#)12. (C) In early October 2009, after a closed trial, an Azerbaijani court sentenced the group of alleged terrorists arrested the previous spri

[1](#)13. (C) In another development likely to anger Iran, on October 4 an Israeli military equipment company opened a branch office in Baku, amidst

...Evokes GOAJ Protest -----

[1](#)14. (C) The Iranian media attacks led to a highly unusual publicized protest by the GOAJ to the Iranian Ambassador and Foreign Ministry on Oct

GOAJ Accusations on Heroin Smuggling -----

[1](#)15. (S) Though relatively unpublicized compared to the above issues, GOAJ concern over the skyrocketing of Iranian-processed heroin and other narcotics in Azerbaijan is also a potential source of tension.

-- The Iranian government has repeatedly released convicted Iranian drug smugglers handed over by the GOAJ under the terms of a treaty allowing

-- Senior Afghan government authorities have told the GOAJ that Iranian security forces are actively collaborating with selected groups of Afgh

-- Interrogations of Iranian smugglers arrested in Azerbaijan over the past year have elicited claims of active Iranian security personnel coll  
Comment -----

¶16. (S) GOAJ leaders, from President Aliyev on down, have made it very clear that they consider Iran a major source of potential instability,  
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